Grammaticalization of the Reported Speech Frames

Wo shuo and Ni shuo in Mandarin Conversation*

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This paper studies how the speaker-hearer interaction has motivated the first-person and second-person speech frames to undergo grammaticalization. Through the mechanisms of metonymy and pragmatic inferencing, the speech frame wo shuo has become a thought frame, and even a pragmatic marker of self-assertion to take the floor and secure attention. Ni shuo, on the other hand, acquires a concessive reading and is further grammaticalized into a pragmatic marker of contrast and attention getting through pragmatic inferencing.

Key words: reported speech, grammaticalization, metonymy, pragmatic inferencing, pragmatic marker

1. Introduction

By “reported speech,” we prototypically mean the speaker quotes a third party in order to provide evidence for a previous claim (Chafe and Nichols 1986, Coulmas 1986, Mayes 1990, etc.). Reported speech is thus a communication strategy through which the speaker accomplishes the effects of conveying an intended message without mentioning it overtly and without appearing too much “committed” because of the distancing effect of the embedding of the speech frame. The speaker tends not to quote him/herself or the addressee for evidence, since it is less convincing to do self-quotation and the speaker faces an immediate threat from the addressee if improper addressee-quotation happens. In the interactional context of conversation, however, the constructions of self-quotation and addressee-quotation do occur. In this paper, we will investigate when the speaker employs the constructions of self-quotation and addressee-quotation, with special focus on the speech frames wo shuo “I say” and ni shuo “you say,” and why, and how these two types of quotation differ from the prototypical type of third-party-quotation. It is argued that the reported speech frames ni shuo ‘you say’ and wo shuo ‘I say’ are being grammaticalized, due to the interaction in face-to-face conversation, into pragmatic markers to involve the addressee or to assert oneself. The polysemies of the speech verb shuo, namely ‘thought,’ ‘meaning’ and ‘saying,’ have been so contextualized that

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the conversational implicatures derived from the speaker-addressee interaction, such as the quoter and quotee sharing the responsibility for the quoted message, are becoming conventionalized. In other words, the speech frames *ni shuo* ‘you say’ and *wo shuo* ‘I say’ are being interpreted as (reported) thought frames or as attention-getters in certain contexts. The immediacy of the interaction exempts the third person speech frame from the same changing process.

The data in this study consists of 21 recorded dialogues (16 face-to-face conversations and 5 radio interviews), which total approximately 268 minutes.

### 2. Self-quotation frame *Wo Shuo* ‘I Say’

Little research has been done in the literature on self-quotation, except for Macaulay (1987), who states that self-quotation is used for *distancing* since the speaker presents himself/herself as an actor in a scene, and Maynard (1996: 213), who explores self-quotation in Japanese conversations from the perspective of multivoicedness, and observes that the quoted speech now is “one step further from the immediate discourse of the speaker” and that self-quoting has “an objectifying and distancing effect.” Maynard also points out that, by means of direct-style self-quotation, the speaker purposefully blends contexts to create new meanings. It is true that, by means of direct self-quotations, speaker H, in the file of “matchmaking” in the corpus used, has been able to distance herself from the reported message by using her there-and-then voice, and to appear objective especially when the messages are assessment-laden. However, the placement of the there-and-then voice in the current context has enabled H to create new pragmatic meanings, such as depicting herself as an angel of justice, and is thus performing the function of self-assertion under the disguise of distancing objectiveness.

In the Mandarin conversational corpus, we can identify six types of self-quotation, which can in turn be categorized into two groups, the first three as one group reporting some previous event and the last three as the other securing the audience’s attention. One is the prototypical type of reported speech, reporting a speech act that happened some time ago in a different context, while a second type involves reporting a previous speech act in the same context. A third type is reported thought without any original speech act. A fourth type is overt realization of a usually implicit performative. There also exists the presentation of the speaker’s current thought, opinion or belief without a previous thought. The last type is a pragmatic marker of attention getting. It is also argued that the first-person speech frame is being grammaticalized into an emphatic self-assertion marker through the mechanisms of metonymy and pragmatic inferencing.
The first type of self-quotation occurs when the speaker reports to the current addressee what s/he said to the original addressee in a prior context. (1) is one such example.

(1) H: ..oh 本來  是 說 要 台大 的,-  
PAR originally COP say want Taida DE  
<XX> 說 清華 的 也 可以,\  
say Chinghua DE also do  
(H)(0.6) 然後 我 就 說,-  
theh I jiu say  
→  ...(0.8) 我 說,-  
I say  
<Q. 好好 好\  
okay-okay-okay  
.你 這麼 嘮唆\  
you so long-winded  
.我 給 你 一個 跟 你 一樣 兢悍 的 人\Q> (Matchmaking)  
I give you one CLF with you same tough DE person  
H: ‘Originally, he wanted someone who had graduated from Taiwan University. But then he said graduates from Chinghua University will do. Then I said, I said, “Okay okay, since you set up so many stringent requirements, I’ll introduce you to someone as tough as you are.”’

In the previous discourse leading to (1), the speakers H, I, and M were talking about the stringent requirements a man had set for his future spouse. H then responded with the direct-style self-quotation in (1), which implies that she was issuing “punishment” to the man face-to-face. With direct-style self-quotation, H gives the impression that she commented on the man in his presence (the original context). And the shift in context and audience gives H an opportunity to say what she intended to say to the current addressees. Yet, it is not her here-and-now voice but her there-and-then voice that is responsible for the authorship of the utterance. She has kept a distance from the reported message. The subjectivity of her opinion now takes on an impression of objectivity because of the relative irrelevance of the here-and-now voice. Self-quotation is thus a strategy to assert oneself and build up the speaker’s positive face. By giving the man a dressing down “face-to-face”, H in (1) has successfully depicted herself as a person with a sense of justice in the current context.
The second type of self-quotation is triggered by unsuccessful communication when the antecedent utterance was not fully caught by the listener. The “current” addressee is also the “original” addressee. Thus this type usually performs the function of clarification, with the speaker repeating or rewording an antecedent utterance so that the intended message may be fully appreciated. Since what needs clarification is usually the propositional message of a previous utterance, indirect speech is the default form used. Direct speech is marked and rare.1 Besides, it is always the current addressee that the clarification is oriented to, which also suggests the use of indirect speech.

In (2), there are two self-quotations belonging to the second type, each for a different reason.

(2) → 1 J: (0)開喜烏龍茶如果防癌的話,-
    Kaixi Wulong tea if preventive of cancer dehua(if)
2 .我們家倒是喝很多開喜烏龍茶, 
    our home actually drink a lot of Kaixi Wulong tea
3 I: ..[<@@@@>]
4 L: ..[ai你跟我那小叔一樣.] 
    you with my that brother-in-law same
5 .五罐飲料, 
    five CLF beverages
6 J: ..沒有, 
    no
7 .那我家買的, 
    that my mother buy DE
→8 ...(1.1)我說,-
    I say
9 .開喜烏龍茶<@如果可以防癌的話,-
    Kaixi Wulong tea if able to prevent cancer dehua(if)
10 .我們家真的喝很多.<@> 
    our family really drink a lot
→11 L: ..<P可以防癌."P> 
    able to prevent cancer
12 J: ...真的啊. 
    really PAR

1 In my data, there is no direct speech used for clarification, though examples like ‘我是說，他不去，’
    ‘不是說，他不可以去’ are possible.
In the previous discourse, the speakers were saying that it seemed that more and more people got cancer. The self-quotation in lines 8, 9, and 10 repeats the utterance in lines 1 and 2, which introduces a new subtopic. The repetition is motivated by the fact that J’s listeners didn’t take up her topic overtly. I responded in line 3 to the new subtopic with laughter only; L digressed to her brother-in-law’s habit of drinking a lot of beverages in lines 4 and 5. J, determined to bring her topic back into the spotlight, repeated her previous utterance in lines 1 and 2 and prefaced it with wo shuo ‘I said,’ so as to seek attention and due responses. The speech frame wo shuo ‘I said’ indicates the speaker’s insistence (cf. Okamoto 1995) to renew the topic.

The self-quotation in lines 14 and 15, however, is triggered by a misunderstanding. L’s utterance in line 11 was muted disbelief to herself, yet J took it as an assertion, so L had to clarify her previous utterance by re-wording it with a conditional marker ruguo...dehua, said with a much more prominent prosody. The speech frame wo shi shuo in line 14 with an emphatic copula shi, unlike the speech frame in line 8, is ambiguous between “I said” and “I mean” and is interpretable as “I mean or what I mean.” This indicates that it is the propositional meaning that needs clarification, and that the sense of “thought or meaning” of the verb shuo has the potential of being foregrounded, with the sense of “saying” backgrounded or even decayed.

The motivation of the second type of self-quotation develops out of unsuccessful communication in the interaction-in-progress between the current
speaker and hearer. This current speaker-hearer interaction exerts crucial influence on the employment and interpretation of the first-person speech frame, which in turn shows that the verb of saying *shuo* is undergoing semantic change.

The third type of self-quotation is in fact reported thought. *Wo shuo* in (3), for example, reports a previous inner speech. It is not really a quotation in the strict sense of the term. Apparently there was no prior speech in the original context. And what the speaker means is “I was wondering,” implying the existence of a previous thought or inner speech.

(3) 1 H: ..你 目前 是 從事 什麼 樣 的 工作 呢?/

You now COP engage what CLF DE word PAR

2 Y: …(0.8)uN=-,-

UN

3 ..公職(/zi/).

public servant

→4 H: ...(0.7)haN=2/

5 Y: …(0.6)公職(/zhi/).

Public servant

6 H: (0)oh [公職.]1

PAR public servant

7 D: [oh 公.]1[職.]2

PAR public servant

8 H: [我]2 聽,-

I hear

9 …聽 作 是 花花[公子 的 公子].

hear into COP playboy DE boy

10 Y: [<@@@>]

11 H: ..我 說 還 有 這個 行業 啊\[ Seating\]

I say still have this occupation PAR

H: ‘What’s your occupation?’
Y: ‘UN, government job (/gonzhi/’.
H: ‘What?’
Y: ‘Government job.’
H: ‘Oh, government job.’
D: ‘Oh, government job.’
H: ‘I misunderstood it for “boy (/gonzi/” like in “playboy.” And I say (I was wondering), whether there exists such an occupation?’
When Y told the radio hosts that his occupation was a government job (/gongzhi/), the hostess H, however, mistook it for ‘boy (/gongzi/),’ so she was baffled wondering what occupation that was, as shown by the question in line 4. After some clarification, H revealed the misunderstanding in her mind in lines 8 and 9 and publicizes her original puzzle in the reported speech in line 11. *Shuo* ‘say’ here is best interpreted as “was wondering,” and the reported speech in line 11 is in fact a reported thought, since there did exist such a previous thought, which is further evidenced by the final particle *a*.

The use of verbs of saying instead of verbs of thinking in the expression of a previous thought is due to the publicization effect of the act of saying: when you *say* something, you publicize it, making it transparent to the outer world; but if you just *think* of something, it remains your inner thought. There is a distance between mental thinking and physical saying (Hirose 1995), though one cannot do without the other. So if we substitute *wo zai xiang shuo* ‘I was thinking’ for *wo shuo* ‘I say’ in line 11, then the speaker is thought to be reporting her inner speech only and in a “reserved” way, and has no intention to publicize or assert it explicitly.

This third type of *wo shuo* has developed into a common and lexicalized expression. Take (4) and (5), for example.

(4) 我 说 嘛  
I say PAR(Ma)  
‘I would say so.’ or ‘Told you.’

(5) 我 说 对 嘛  
I say right PAR(Ma)  
‘I would say so.’

Without any context, (4) and (5) can be understood as the speaker’s agreement with a preceding utterance. But there is more than mere agreement. By means of (4), the speaker indicates that there was a previous thought of his which happened to be fully in accord with the idea expressed by his interactant just now. The speaker is in effect saying that this idea had already been in his mind and that he would have said so in the same situation.

An agreement with the hearer or confirmation of the speaker’s own thought is

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2 One of the reviewers suggested that the meaning of the lexicalized speech frame with final *ma* is a refutation of the hearer’s doubt or a confirmation of the speaker’s thought, and that the author should distinguish the meanings of the variants with and without particles. But since (4) and (5) are constructed examples, and since the purpose of the two examples is to show that the reported thought reading of the speech frame is conventionalized, no context needed, the author has decided not to complicate the issue discussed.
hindsight that needs compensation through some forceful mechanism. Compare (4) with *wo ye shi zheyang xiang* ‘I thought so, too,’ and we will find that the forceful assertiveness needed to make up for hindsight agreement is missing in the latter, because just thinking is not enough evidence to turn an inferior hindsight into foresight. The presupposition of an original speech (reported speech) rather than just a thought (reported thought) has enabled the speaker to successfully compensate for the inferiority of giving a hindsight and regain the superiority of having a foresight in verbal communication, since a physical voice can surely be better heard than an inner voice.

“I” am *the* speaker. “I” have the privilege to claim that I had such a previous thought, whether it was true or not, and “I” am free of the risk of being challenged. Thus in conversational discourse, the speech frame *wo shuo* alone has inherited the implication that there existed a previous speech. As shown in the lexicalized expressions in (4) and (5), an imaginary original voice is the intended message of a self-quotation.

Whatever the intended message is, the verb *shuo* in the third type of *wo shuo* has lost the sense of ‘saying.’ The verb *shuo* is getting bleached\(^3\) (Bybee 2003) into the sense of ‘thought’ only, because of metonymic inference in the context.

The fourth type of *wo shuo* ‘I say’\(^4\) is an overt realization of the speech act of saying (cf. Liu 1986). There is of course no original speech nor thought that can be found. For example,

\[(6)\]

1 A: ..開車,-
    driving a car
2 ..我 就 是 這麼 大 一 個 框框,-
    I jiu COP this big one CLF frame
3 ..摩托車 還 要 這樣子,-
    motorcycle still need this way
4 ..<F suhsuhsuhsuhsuh.F>
7 C: ...(0.9)我 說 鄭 阿姨 [妳 眼睛,-]
    I say Zou aunt your eyes,-
6 A: [昨天,-] (Family talk)

\(^3\) One of the reviewers suggested that the use of “bleached” did not serve the phenomena right, since the meanings are not “bleached” but in fact are often “extended” or enriched. But the author takes the position that, when an expression is getting grammaticalized, the original core meaning or semantic meaning is reduced or bleached, though at the same time it has developed new grammatical or pragmatic meanings.

\(^4\) Zheng (1983) observes that this type of *wo shuo* is relatively semantically bleached.
A was talking about her experience in driving a car and riding a motorcycle. But C presented a new topic in line 5 prefaced with "I say." Though A continued her own topic about how well she rode a motorcycle in line 6, and aborted the new topic in line 5, yet enough information was revealed to characterize the use of "I say." This type of "I say" is a speech act explicitly expressed, usually occurs at the very beginning of a conversation or a topic, and tends to cooccur with a vocative, usually the name of the addressee. We don’t usually make explicit the speech act of saying in conversation since it is quite manifest that I am saying when I open my mouth and utter words. According to Grice’s maxim of quantity, we say more to express more. Therefore with the overt realization of the speech act of saying with "I say," the speaker is saying ‘Your attention please,’ or ‘Hey, listen to me’ (Romero Trillo 1997), drawing the addressee’s attention to an upcoming topic. Attention-getting thus turns out to be the primary function of the speech frame in cases like (6) to prefigure a new topic. In other words, attention-getting through this overt speech act has been a conventionalized conversational implicature through the intermediary of the act of saying. Other common attention-getting speech frames with overt speech acts are "I tell you" and "I tell you," both of which function primarily to secure the addressee’s attention.

The fifth type of "I say," closely related to the overt performative type, is a presentation of a current thought (cf. Liu 1986). For example,

(7) H: 你 知道 吗?
    you know PAR
    …我 真的 從頭到尾 都 不 知道\n    I really from beginning to end all not know
 → …(0.8)所以 我 說 作媒 太 難 了\   (Matchmaking)
    so I say matchmaking too hard PAR
H: ‘You know. I really didn’t have any idea about that from the very beginning. So I say matchmaking is a hard job.’

In the previous discourse, H was saying that she did not know that a male client of hers had had high blood pressure and had refused to take any medication. "Wo shuo"
here is ambiguous between an overt performative and a thought preface denoting ‘my personal experience tells me that…’

It seems that the speaker exploits the effect of attention getting of performatives to highlight a critical point, a conclusion in (7). In the latter interpretation, however, wo shuo behaves like ‘I think,’ making the framed utterance epistemic and expressing personal beliefs. The sense of ‘saying’ is getting lost, and the performative verb of saying is being changed into a performative verb of thinking, through metonymy.

The last type of Wo shuo as exemplified in (8) is much more like a pragmatic marker of self-assertion to compete for the floor and secure the addressee’s attention.

(8) 1 H: <@我 說 我 驚死你們 這一家 人了.>
   I say I scare to death you this one family PAR
2       ..不要<XX>@>
   no
3 I:   [<@@@@]>1
4 M:   [<@@@@]>1
5 I:   [@好 好笑.@]>2
   very funny
6 H:   [我 說.-]
   I say
→7     ...我 說.-
   I say
8       ..eh.-
   eh
9       ..他們結婚的 時候.-
   they marry DE time
10      ..因為 我 還在台北 嘛 hoN.\because I still in Taipei PAR PAR
11      ...(0.7)我也 沒去參加啦 hoN.\I also not go join PAR PAR
12      ...(0.7)喜酒 也 沒 喝到,-
   wedding wine also not drink dao
13      ..<@喜餅 也 沒 吃到,-
   wedding cake also not eat dao
   ..<XXX>

5 The following constructed example is also ambiguous between a performative and “I think”:
   我說 我們 還是去吧
   I say we still COP go PAR
   ‘I say, let’s go.’
In the previous discourse, H was saying that the friend who kept complaining about her husband’s playing mahjong wanted H to make a match for her son, and H responded with lines 1 and 2. Then H turned in lines 6 and 7 with wo shuo to a subtopic that she, as a matchmaker, had reaped no benefits from a marriage she helped to bring about, but instead had been complained about for more than twenty years. Wo shuo in this example is neither an overt speech act of saying since there is nothing to claim nor a thought frame since no epistemicity is necessary for the following utterances. It in fact functions as a pragmatic self-assertion marker to take the floor and secure the audience’s attention, which can be evidenced by the overlapping of line 5 and line 6 and the repetition of wo shuo, a kind of repair.

To sum up, though it is hard to categorize the speech frame wo shuo distinctly, the synchronic data do show different types of wo shuo with different discourse functions, manifesting a typical grammaticalization process. The motivation is the interaction between interlocutors through the mechanisms of metonymy and pragmatic inferencing. The verb shuo is polysemous with different senses ‘thought, meaning, and saying’, and in the interactional discourse the sense of ‘saying’ has dropped off (Sweetser 1990, Heine et al. 1991, Hopper and Traugott 1993, Bybee
2003). Reported speech thus becomes reported thought through metonymic inferencing. As to the overt performative, it is plausible to claim that the use of *wo shuo* as an overt speech act is a later development, since where both nonspeech-act verb and speech-act verb meanings coexist, the former preceded the latter, because the speech-act meaning is more discourse-situated (Traugott 1989). And thanks to the interaction between speaker and hearer in conversation, the overt speech act of *wo shuo* has obtained the primary function of attention getting. When the sense of saying in the performative is dropped, the speech frame becomes a thought frame, retaining the highlighting implicature. At last, when neither the sense of saying nor the sense of thought is needed in a context, the speech frame becomes a pragmatic marker used to compete for the floor with the attention-getting or highlighting implicature singled out.

The grammaticalization processes of *wo shuo* can thus be diagrammed as two tracks in what follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Track 1</th>
<th>Track 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) reported speech frame --metonymy-- → reported thought frame</td>
<td>(2) performative --metonymy-- → thought frame -- pragmatic inferencing -- → pragmatic marker of attention getting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Diagram 1 The grammaticalization processes of the first-person speech frame *wo shuo*

In track 1, the verb of saying is tensed, i.e. past tense, since reporting previous speech events is the main concern. The verb of saying in track 2 is present tense or tenseless, since the primary function is oriented to the here and now. Though there are two routes of semantic change, the unidirectionality of both routes is obvious, i.e., getting more subjective and expressive. A semantically bleached pragmatic marker emerges at a rather late stage. Based on the synchronic variations in discourse, we conclude that they observe the principles of grammaticalization (Hopper 1991).

*Wo shuo* ‘I say’ enables the speaker to assert his own opinion. *Ni shuo* ‘you say,’ on the other hand, is an addressee-oriented structure. It is thus usually used to ask the addressee for confirmation or recognition. As Thompson and Mulac (1991: 322) observes, “markers of evidentiality and epistemicity are skewed towards first person singular declaratives and second person questions.” The semantic change of *ni shuo* may thus take a different route from *wo shuo*. Let’s now turn to the second person speech frame *ni shuo* ‘you say.’

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6 Though Chinese is a L-tenseless language, the readings of past tense or present tense are based on the metalinguistic (or M-) tense (Levinson 1983:77).
3. **Addressee-quotatation frame* Ni Shuo ‘You Say’**

*Wo shuo ‘I say’* is speaker-oriented and involves self-assertion; *ni shuo ‘you say’* is definitely addressee-oriented and is a mechanism to involve the addressee (Biq 1991). In the Mandarin conversational data, *ni shuo ‘you say’* 1) introduces typical reported speech, 2) prefaces a thought without an antecedent, 3) introduces a concessive clause, 4) functions as a pragmatic marker of contrast, and 5) performs the discourse function of securing the addressee’s attention.

Speakers quote other people in order to enhance the credibility of the information they intend to convey. What if the quotee happens to be the addressee? Would it be more effective? Look at (9).

(9) 1 L: ..我們 有沒有 考慮 找 其它 這個 的 企業,-
   we have-not-have consider look for other this DE enterprise
2       ..或 是 什麼 來 投資 啊?/
   or COP what come invest PAR
3 J:  ..<X[靠不住].>\n   not dependable
4 L: [其它的] 組織 企業 來 投資 /
   other incorporated enterprise come invest
5 J:  ..因 爲 現在 你 看 ho,-
   because now you look PAR
→6 L:  ..因 爲 你 說,-
   because you say
7       ..你 說 那 建 起來 的 財力 不是說,-
   you say Na build qilai DE finance not
8       ..我們 能夠 分擔。
   we able share
   (Church)
L: ‘Have we considered looking for some outside enterprises to make investment?’
J: ‘You cannot count on this.’
L: ‘Some other incorporated enterprises to invest.’
J: ‘Because now you look,’
L: ‘Because you said, you said we could not afford the shares needed for church-building.’

When J did not accept L’s suggestion in line 3 to look outside for money to build a church, L presented as evidence J’s previous speech in lines 6, 7 and 8 about not being
able to collect enough funds from among the church members, so as to reinforce his suggestion. Quoting the addressee is supposedly a more effective way of persuasion, since it is usually harder for the addressee to deny himself/herself for the sake of face. In (9) L adopts the strategy of quoting the addressee as evidence to support his suggestion, though eventually he failed to persuade J.

And what if misquotation happens? Since the addressee will surely scrutinize the accuracy of the quotation, the quoter should be particularly careful in the quotee’s presence. This leads to a situation where if the quotee is the second person the quote is mostly realized as questions asking for clarification or confirmation, and direct speech is rarely used.

For example,

(10) → B: ..不 是 妳 也 講 眼睛 怪怪 的.
   not COP you also say eyes wrong DE
   ..那 時 候 在 車 上.
   that time at bus on
G: .. 哦 =.
   oh
   ..對,-
   right
   ..好 痛 哦.
   very ache PAR
B: ‘Didn’t you say that there was something wrong with your eyes?
   At that time on the bus.’
G: ‘Oh, ya, they hurt a lot.’

In the previous discourse B suggested that G not wear contact lenses for the time being since she had been having problems with her eyes. B also reminded G that several years ago her contact lenses also did some damage to her cornea. The arrowed reported speech in (10) functions as evidence to prove B’s previous statement about this incident. It is a rhetorical question: B is sure about G’s saying something was wrong with her eyes but he still asks for G’s confirmation, since it is G who knows best. G’s response with dui ‘ya’ confirms the confirmation function of reported speech with the second person as the source individual.

(11) below is still reported speech, but the propositional meaning of the quoted speech is the primary concern. In (11), T is asking B for confirmation.
In the previous discourse, B was telling T why his teacher forbade them to play basketball in the corridor in front of the classroom. T was now summarizing the previous talk and asking B to confirm it.

The translation ‘you mean’ indicates that ni shuo ‘you say’ here is the counterpart of the type of wo shuo ‘I say’ meaning ‘I mean.’ With ‘I mean,’ the speaker is trying to clarify his intended, yet misunderstood message to the addressee, while with ‘you mean,’ the speaker is seeking confirmation that she understands the addressee right. The default interpretation is always that it is the propositional meaning rather than the presentational form itself that is the focal point for clarification or confirmation.

The second type of ni shuo found in the corpus prefaces an opinion or thought without any antecedent speech. For example, (12) is a conventional expression used to ask for the addressee’s opinion.

(12) G:  ‘你說呢?’  (Treating)
      you say PAR
G:  ‘What do you say?’ Or ‘What do you think?’

It does not need any context for (12) to be interpreted as ‘What do you think?’ The
use of the verb of saying is to ask for the verbalization of thought, a command, very much like “Tell me what you think of it.” (12) illustrates that ni shuo ‘you say’ is conventionalized as an expression used to ask the addressee to verbalize his/her opinion. The sense of ‘saying’ is fading away through metonymic inference. Ni shuo ‘you say’ has changed into ‘you think.’

The verb of saying has been observed to be closely related to conditionals. Lyons (1995) points out that the conditional mood can be used in declarative sentences to express a particular kind of subjective epistemic modality, comparable with that expressed by the evidential mood. Willett (1988) claims that evidentials are part of the marking of epistemic modality. Frajzyngier (1991) and Romaine and Lange (1991) observe that information obtained through speech is not as reliable as information obtained through direct observation, that verbs of saying intrinsically have epistemic value, and that in languages like Czech “doubt in truth” derives historically from ‘he says’. All this research tells us that the conditional mood seems closely associated with the domain of speech. Mandarin displays a similar development: the conditional marker dehua ‘of words’ originates in the domain of speech and is now so semantically bleached that it has become a conditional marker. The speech frame ni shuo ‘you say’ and sometimes only shuo ‘say’ seem to be developing into a grammatical marker introducing a concessive conditional clause in certain contexts as well. This is the third type of ni shuo found in the corpus.

This conditional interpretation, like the question interpretation, is the result of interaction between speaker and hearer. The speaker acts as if he asked the addressee to verbalize some message without really giving the addressee any chance to say it. Both the quoter and the quotee share the knowledge that the command is only a hypothetical alternative which does not exist, and conditionality (‘if you say’) is thus assumed. If the quotee is a third party, then the hearer does not share the same background conditional assumption with the speaker, the speaker has no way of issuing a hypothetic command, and the hypotheticality interpretation cannot result. That is also why no conditionality is developed out of a reported speech construction with the third person as the source individual.

(13) is an illustration of ni shuo ‘you say’ and shuo ‘say’ introducing a concessive conditional clause.

(13) B: 1 ...說 历史, 喔,
talk about history PAR
1⇒ 2 ...說 它 長 了, -
say it long LE
3 ...好像 我們 所 記得 並 不 這麼 多 \
like we suo remember bing not this much

A: 4 ..對\nright

2→B: 5 ..但是你講說它沒有,-
but you say COMP it not have

6 ..沒有什麼歷程呢,-
not have what course PAR

7 ..其實國語歌曲從以前周璇時代,-
in fact Mandarin songs from before Zhouxuan time

8 ..三四十年代的歌流傳下來,-
thirty forty era DE song hand down

9 ..其實它還蠻豐富的\( Singer\)
in fact it still very rich DE

B: ‘As for the history (of Mandarin songs in Taiwan), (if) (you) say it is long, yet it seems that we don’t remember that much of it.’

A: ‘Yes.’

B: ‘But (if) you say there is no history or no trace, yet, in fact, since the time of Zhouxuan, a lot of the songs in the thirties and forties have been handed down, in fact it turns out to be quite a rich history.’

In arrow 1 only the verb of saying shuo is presented, with the generic subject deleted; in arrow 2 another verb of saying jiang is used, followed by the complementizer shuo, resulting in the speech frame ni jiang shuo. Both present a conditional topic (Haiman 1978) for the following comments, which here seem to be a challenge to the hypothetical condition. Concessiveness is thus derived. A pattern has been formed: “If you say A, it is not exactly so; but if you say -A, it is not the case, either.” No previous speech exists. Ni ‘you’ is generic. Ni shuo is decategorized. With ni shuo ‘you say’ or its variations like shuo or ni jiang shuo, we can set a metalinguistic conditional situation (see Sweetser 1990, Dancygier and Sweetser 1996 for metalinguistic conditional) for the following statements. A similar relationship is illustrated by (ni) shuo ta lan, ta dushu you man yonggong de, (ni) shuo ta qinlao, ta you changchang toulan ‘(you) say he is lazy, yet he studies quite hard; (you) say he is diligent, yet he fools around a lot.’ Since without any context similar conditional interpretations can be obtained, it is plausible to conclude that the epistemicity or conditionality reading associated with the evidential ni shuo or shuo is

7 It is noteworthy that when the conditional is about the addressee, the speech clause can only be shuo, and ni shuo is not allowed. For example, shuo ni lan, ni hai man yonggong ‘Say you are lazy, yet you study quite hard.’ It seems to suggest that though ni is generic, it still indicates the second person.
conventionalized.

The speech frame here is so semantically bleached and decategorized that it functions like a grammatical marker. Yet the double-voicedness of the reported speech construction (I am quoting you) has made the generic ni ‘you’ imply ‘us.’ “I” am the speaker but with ni shuo “you” are also a co-author. The conditional ni shuo ‘you say’ is thus very much like Let’s say in English. Co-authorship is thus contextually implicated.

The concessive reading of ni shuo indicates that the following main clause presents a contrastive claim, which can be further evidenced by the co-occurrence of contrastive markers like keshi ‘but’ and qishi ‘actually’ or ‘in fact,’ as shown in lines 7 and 9 in (13).

The fourth type of ni shuo ‘you say’ behaves like a pragmatic marker of contrast, compatible with the challenge reading, to get the addressee’s attention and hedge the speaker’s claim (cf. Liu 1986, Biq 1991, Tao 1996). According to the persistence principle of grammaticalization, later constraints on structure or meaning can only be understood in the light of earlier meanings (Hopper 1991, Hopper and Traugott 1993). Ni of ni shuo, though a generic pronoun, is still a second person, which certainly will attract the addressee’s attention to scrutinize his share of responsibility for the quoted message, and with the speech frame the speaker is able to distance himself from the message, hedging his claim.

This type of ni shuo ‘you say’ is exemplified by (14).

(14) C: …在今後幾百年以内,…
     From now on several hundred year within
     .中國不會成為世界上最…,
     China not will become world on most
     …最強大的=,…
     most powerful DE
     …一個地方\,
     one CLF place
     B: …可是,\

But
→ you say Taiwan
   ..台灣也沒有辦法去,…
   Taiwan also not have way to
   …那麼小一個地方\,
   so small one CLF place
In the talk about the situation between Taiwan and China, B is expressing her opinion about the future relations between China and Taiwan: Taiwan is too small to take the place of China. With topics as big as “the future of Chinese people,” B chose not to be assertive and to use ni shuo ‘you say’ to hedge her claim, inviting the addressee to share the authorship and thus responsibility for the opinion (cf. Liddicoat 1997 on the conditional as a hedging device).

Nishuo in (14) does not carry with it the concessive clause, yet it prefaxes a contrastive claim to C’s “China would be the most powerful country in the world.” It is reasonable to argue that during the grammaticalization process the concessive clause is understood and dropped so that the concessive conjunction has become a contrastive adverb (Huang, personal communication). The co-occurrence with keshi ‘but’ in (14) and qishi “actually” in (13) and (15), suggests a close connection between a concessive grammatical marker and a contrastive pragmatic marker.

(15) is an utterance I heard on an occasion:

(15) 我 只 吃 了 沙 拉 麵 包
I only eat ASP salad bread
→ 你 說 其 實 湯 裡 面 也 沒 有 什 麼 東 西
you say actually soup inside also not have what thing (Heard)
‘(For lunch), I only had salad, bread, and you say, in fact, there was not much in the soup.’

The speaker was saying that she got hungry easily in the early evening because she did not eat much for lunch; then she went on to specify what she ate for lunch: some salad, some bread, and soup. Before she got to “soup,” she knew her “not much” sounded “much,” so she hedged her utterance about soup with addressee-oriented ni shuo ‘you say,’ indicating that she needed to enter into alliance and co-authorship with the addressee (see papers in Hill and Irvine 1993) to counter a potential threatening expectation. If the addressee is held to be a co-author, the addition of “soup” in (15) tends to induce agreement and would not counter the claim “not much.” Ni shuo here is very much like English you know, which appeals to shared knowledge as a
way of converting an opponent to one’s own side in a dispute (Schiffrin 1987: 279).

In reported speech, the reported clause contains both the current speaker’s voice and the original speaker’s voice. This double-voicedness implies a share of the responsibility; in other words, the speaker has distanced himself from the reported message and is not completely responsible. Besides, the speaker and the addressee share the knowledge that *ni* is in fact generic and *shuo* does not really occur. *Ni shuo* is semantically bleached. Yet in the current context where “you” and “I” are the major interactants, the contextual implicatures of double-voicedness and responsibility sharing are so associated with *ni shuo* that they become conventionalized meanings of this type of *ni shuo*.

*Ni shuo* may be further bleached into a pragmatic marker of attention only. For example,

(16) B: ..真的- ne,-
    really PAR
→ ..你- 說,-
    you say
..你- 看- 他- 領先- 四 分,-
    you see he lead four scores
..有- 沒- 有?/
    have-not-have
A: (0)比賽- 就- 到了.
    game jiu over LE
B: ..一-局- 又- 被- 扳- 回- 去- 了.
    one set again bei overturn back LE
(Baseball)
B: ‘Really. **You say, you see** the situation is the other team leads by four runs, right?’
A: ‘And the game will be over soon.’
B: ‘One inning is overturned again.’

In (16), B talks about the level of excellence of those baseball players who have played in the Major Leagues: they can turn things around within a very short time. *Ni shuo* ‘you say’ here, so semantically bleached, can never be viewed as a speech frame, nor a concessive conjunction, nor a contrastive marker. It functions to secure the addressee’s attention only, evidenced by the repair into *ni kan* ‘you see,’ a prototypical attention getter. *Ni shuo* here has been conventionalized into a discourse marker of attention getting through the pragmatic inferencing in the interactional conversational discourse.
To sum up, if the quotee is the addressee, the reported speech tends to function as confirmation asking, and the addressee is usually called to attention since he is now held responsible for the quoted information. And indirect speech is the preferred form since in the presence of the addressee the speaker runs the risk of being corrected if the direct form is used. The verb *shuo* is polysemous; in certain contexts, the sense of “saying” has dropped off, and *ni shuo* becomes a thought frame through the mechanism of metonymy. And owing to the interaction between speaker and hearer in conversation (since only *wo shuo* ‘I say’ and *ni shuo* ‘you say’ manifest grammaticalization procedures), pragmatic meanings associated with reported speech such as epistemicty and responsibility sharing are getting conventionalized (Traugott 1989, Traugott and König 1991, Hopper and Traugott 1993). The speech frame with the second person as the source individual has been grammaticalized to behave like a grammatical marker introducing a concessive conditional marker (derived from epistemicity) and a pragmatic marker of contrast (derived from concessiveness) and a discourse marker of attention getting (derived from co-authorship or sharing of responsibility) through the mechanism of pragmatic inferencing. Contextual implicatures are conventionalized through use in interaction.

The grammaticalization of *ni shuo* can be diagrammed in two routes below, based on the synchronic data we have had.

![Diagram 2](image-url)

**Diagram 2** The grammaticalization process of the second-person speech frame *ni shuo*

4. Conclusion

Though no diachronic data is available to verify the speculated changes, the synchronic data do show different types of first- and second-person speech frames with distinct discourse functions, manifesting a typical grammaticalization process from more concrete, objective interpretations to more subjective, expressive readings (Traugott 1989, 1995a, 1995b, 2001, 2003, Traugott and König 1991, etc.). Since the third-person speech frame does not reveal similar phenomena, it is plausible to claim the motivation behind the changes is the interaction between the speaker and the addressee through the mechanisms of metonymy and pragmatic inferencing. Besides, the changes of the second-person speech frame reveal a more complicated process
which involves conditionality and contrast, than those of the first-person speech frame. This indicates that the involvement of the addressee and, in a sense, the face-to-face interaction has exerted a significant influence on the emergence of grammar. In other words, the asymmetrical behaviors of different person speech frames certify that grammar is discourse-motivated and emergent (Hopper, 1988).

The grammaticalization of the speech frame with the first- and second- person as the source individual can be further verified by the decategorization characteristics they display (Hopper 1991, Thompson and Mulac 1991, Bybee 2003 etc.). First of all, in the later stages, the speech frames are no longer a main clause with a specific subject and a verb of saying. For example, in the last three types of ni shuo ‘you say,’ ni has become generic, the act of saying does not even exist, and ni shuo has become a single unit, functioning as a grammatical marker indicating hypotheticality or as a discourse marker of contrast or as a framing move to secure attention. Secondly, since shuo is no longer verbal and wo shuo or ni shuo is no longer a speech frame, the framing structural relationship between shuo ‘say’ and what is said is demised, and the framed clause can be elided or, more accurately, what is framed is in fact a stretch of discourse but not a clause any more. Thirdly, except for the prototypical type of reported speech, the distinction between direct and indirect speech is largely meaningless. When a speaker needs to assert or clarify or confirm a message, the default case is that it is the propositional content that needs confirmation or clarification; and when the speech frame is “decategorized” into a grammatical marker or a pragmatic marker or a framing move, it becomes pointless to distinguish direct and indirect speech since there exists no original context and thus no original voice and the utterance following wo shuo or ni shuo is always oriented to the current context.
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中文對話中話語框架「我說」、「你說」的虛化現象

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說話者與聽者之互動，與文法的塑成，一直都是密切相關。本文
根據斷代語料，觀察出第一人稱與第二人稱話語框架「我說」、「你說」，
因說話者與聽者的互動，而顯現出虛化的現象。藉由轉喻推論
(metonymic inferencing)與語用推論 (pragmatic inferencing)，「我說」
已從話語引述蛻變成思想引述，最後再虛化成語用標誌 (pragmatic
marker)，用以吸引聽者的注意。說話者使用「我說」來宣稱自己的意
見，但當使用「你說」時，說話者要求聽者證實或認同，在互動的過
程中，「你說」甚至能引介表讓步的條件子句，語用推論也讓「你說」
虛化成表對比、吸引注意，以尋求合著 (coauthorship) 關係的語用標誌。

關鍵字：引述結構、虛化、轉喻推論、語用推論、語用標誌